God, foreknowledge, freewill, multiple futures and
Dear Mr. Supposed Philosopher:
I read your short email to me where you said having "freedom" is not merely doing what we want to do, but being able to have done other than we did. This seems crazy for the following reasons:
1. If your definition about freedom is true, then exact foreknowledge does not exist.
2. If exact foreknowledge does not exist, then any talk of freedom is meaningless.
3. Thus, if your definition reflects the way things are, then one can't make sense of 'freedom'.
Philosophy addicted loser:
0. I acknowledge the argument as valid, but not sound. Premiss #2 is false; thus, the conclusion has no bite on me.
1. God does, I'll grant, have foreknowledge, and this even if we have free will (as I defined it). Here's how:
2. First, we can make a distinction between knowing THE exact future (one) and knowing the SET of possible futures (many). Now God is aware of what it is possible to do, all the decisions that I can physically implement at the time of choice. Thus, God is NEVER surprised by what I can do, and indeed God can lay maximally predictive odds on what I MIGHT do. After all, God is a maximally good mathematician and statistician. But there are at least SOME times where the assessed ODDS of me doing action X are high, but where I actually do some other action, Y. This is what it means to say that I have a free will in the libertarian sense.
3. God likes it this way, for if I had no freewill, then I would merely be an extension of God's will, much like a shovel is an extension of my arm.