Philosophy of Action Speculations III

Separating actions from behaviors requires some sort of baseline comparison, a determination on what counts as the default bodily state. Here's an argument which might suggest some analysis:

1. Any state of our body which is its default behavioral state is not to be be counted as an action.
2. A limp body is our default behavioral state.
3. .:. A limp body is not to be counted as an action.

Premise 2 raises a troublesome issue. Consider when one is asleep. The vast majority of the time when I am asleep, I am not moving. (i) Sometimes I turn over from my left side to my right. But when I do so, I awake for just a second or so, make the adjustment, and then go back to sleep. In this case, I am initiating a short action. (ii) But in dreams, I sometimes turn over too. I those cases I am not awake, so I am not initiating an action. In dreams I have a bodily behavior, but that behavior is not an action, since I form no intention to turn over. (iii) Sometimes I am not awake, and I am not dreaming; I am "dead asleep" as the saying goes. Still, a muscle might twitch, or my diaphragm might go through a single, inhale/exhale respiration cycle. Yet these things too count only as behaviors and not actions -- again, since I form no intention to do such behaviors.

Is that the default state of my body -- what it's doing (the vast majority of the time) when I am asleep? The problem here is that I'm not asleep that vast majority of the time. I'm only asleep (at most) a third of the time of a full 24-hour day. This problem arises for singular parts of our bodies too. Here's a related argument (now supposing I'm awake):

4. Any state of our body which is its default behavioral state is not to be be counted as an action.
5. A relaxed vestigial ear muscle is in its default state.
6. .:. A relaxed vestigial ear muscle is not to be counted as an action.

Premise (5) just considers a part of our body. This ear muscle case is easier than the sleeping case, since in the sleeping case I am forming no intentions at all, but in the ear muscle case I just happen not to be forming intentions (or even thinking about) my ear. Furthermore, the vestigial ear muscle[1] case is uncontroversially accurate as a description of our default bodily state, unlike the sleep state case.

Perhaps the error here is thinking that the default state is established merely by how often a body(or body part) is in a state. In addition, the default state should also be assessed as the state of behavior when there is no intention directed upon it. It is important to get clear on the default state issue in order to analyze both 'negative actions' and non-action causal consequences of actions.


O.

REFERENCES

[1] "Human vestigiality" Wikipedia (Accessed Jan. 28, 2010)

Philosophy of Action Speculations II

[ I've been thinking about when somebody is properly said to act. For example, if an Oklahoma tornado blows me bodily into you, and injures you, I didn't act to injure you, even if I did cause injury to you. Or again, the wind causes irritation to my eye, so without even noticing it, I blink my eye. I had behaviors of blinking my eye, but I didn't act to blink my eye. Causes and behaviors are different than actions. Here's another in the series -- B ]

Suppose a policeman, officer Oscar, fires a warning shot to halt the actions of a wayward citizen, Mr. Kane. Unfortunately, the bullet ricochets, subsequently striking and killing Kane. Immediately, Oscar wonders if it was his actions which killed Kane. So, did Oscar act to kill Kane?

Well, there certainly were some antecedent thoughts by Oscar -- he wanted to pull his gun; he wanted to squeeze the trigger, etc. -- and these thoughts resulted in Oscar behaving in ways to carry out those thoughts -- he held his wrist steady, exercised the muscle on his index finger, etc. But the consequences seem all wrong; the death of Kane was not intended (i.e. premeditated) by Oscar. Well, it was not premeditated in any strong sense, though Oscar would have admitted that there was always a small (say .05%) chance of the death of Kane (or anybody) getting killed by a ricochet in such circumstances. We could see this as weak premeditation.

But suppose, contrary to fact, bullets ricochet with 95% probability, and this was commonly known. Let the shooting case be re-adjusted accordingly. Still, the knowledge of the consequent isn't a sure thing, even if the chance of death is very high. Indeed, stipulate Oscar didn't plan ahead, or even think about the killing consequences to Kane. Still, with such knowledge of high odds, does the notion of premeditation even matter as regards whether Oscar acted? in this 95% case, it somehow seems right to say Oscar did act to kill Kane.

But maybe one could take both cases into account in the same way:

1. An act occurs only if somebody premeditates the consequences of their chosen behaviors.
2. Oscar didn't premeditate Kane's death in the .05% case
3. Oscar didn't premeditate Kane's death in the 95% case.
4. So, Oscar didn't act to kill Kane in either case.

In cases of negligence, we say things like, "He should have thought it through." But that just evaluates whether Oscar is morally responsible, not whether he acted. Yet the moral evaluation seems to smuggle in the hidden assumption (without giving evidence for it) that he indeed acted. Yes, we say somebody is morally responsible for some consequence only if s/he acted to bring that consequence about. Fine, but did or did not Oscar so act?

O.

[image] by Scot Olsen in IraqSlogger.com

Philosophy of Action Speculations

Suppose Albert plants a bomb to kill Bill. Perhaps he hides it under Bill's house. But Albert suddenly dies. Two days later, the bomb explodes and kills Bill. Did Albert act to kill Bill?

Common sense quickly says yes. But sometimes common sense is fantastically wrong, as physicists and psychologist take great delight in showing. The burden of proof would require some argument against common sense. An argument against Albert killing Bill might go this way:

1. Something (in this case, a killing) can be considered an 'act' of somebody only if there is an operating intention behind that act.
2. But there is an operating intention behind an act only if the (alleged) actor is alive at the time.
3. Albert was not alive at the time the bomb exploded.

4. So, Albert had no operating intention at the time the bomb exploded (by 3 & 2)
5. Thus, the killing of Bill can't be considered an act of Albert (by 4 & 1)

Premise (3) is stipulated by the story. (2) might be assailable, but it would take some work. (1) seems easiest to rebut. Are there cases where something is an act, but nobody is intending anything?

Suppose, when they kids, Albert bought one of those spring-loaded, fake peanut cans where a snake pops out. He placed it on Bill's kitchen shelf, so as to startle him. Weeks went buy, and Albert forgot all about the peanut can joke. One day Bill opened the can, and was greatly startled. Did Albert act to startle Bill?

Yes, Albert did. Here, it's an easier case, since Albert is still alive. Upon being reminded of the can, young Albert would say he still wants to startle Bill, so the intention is once again operant. Or, suppose Albert had forgotten about the can for only 2 seconds, but the can then springs the fake snake on Bill at the next moment. In the normal course of conversation, no one would reasonably doubt that Albert (successfully) acted to startle Bill.

Intention, therefore, is "gappy." It's like knowledge. A person doesn't know what they know every conscious moment, but if asked what the carpet or floorboards looked like in one's childhood home, a person might bring the hithertofore long-forgotten knowledge immediately to consciousness.

O.

[image] ubergizmo.com