Ebenezer Chicken Scrouge

It seems to presume that the future already exists as a non-contingent state of affairs; furthermore, it also seems to presume that one can actually make comparisons between two elements within this state of affairs from the present moment.

That the metaphysics of the future and the epistemology of the present were both foisted on poor Ebenezer so suddenly, all in one statement, no doubt accounts for his gaping beak of surprise -- well, that and the pronouncement on his existential plight, granted.

Did I mention I'm a Philosopher on Christmas break with no students around?

O.

REFERENCES

[ image ] savage chickens website.

On everything 'having a cause' vs. 'having a reason'

Every happening has a cause, but every happening having a reason is quite a bit different.

So a philosophy friend of mine who does metaphysics posted this on his Facebook wall, and I asked him the following in an interchange:

him: I think the first part of this is false. Not everything happens for a reason. But the second clause is certainly true and worthy of posting.
me: Let 1 = Everything that happens has a set of causes for why it happened. And let 2 = a set of causes just is a reason Is 1 true? Is 2 true? If so, the first part [of the picture above] could be seen as true, but I'm wondering what you think of 1 and 2.
him: Does 'cause' in 1 and 2 mean 'efficient cause'?

Hmm.  He certainly asked the right question. The question rightly presumes that one should draw from Aristotle's careful partitioning of the concept of cause.  Of course, now I had to answer him, having brought the whole issue up. What would I mean by 'cause' in 1 and 2?

I don't mean final cause, but piety precludes me from excluding it in all instances of events. Maybe God has a few Plans for some events, though not, I'd say, plans for every event.

I don't mean material cause.  Again pious man that I am, I would not want to limit myself there, for who knows what Spinozic activies God initiates outside of this realm, or from outside this realm into it?

I certanly would mean formal cause, but some causes in conjunction bring about random events, so I'd be merely saying, at least, that when patterns of stuff happens it causes other patterns of stuff to happen -- hardly controversial, and nets me only a trivial truth for 1 and 2.

Now, by 'efficient cause' I understand as a thing that acts, happens, or exists in such a way that some specific thing happens as a result. Stuff happens, yeah, but does specific stuff happen?

Everything specific is relative to a greater context, like part is relative to whole. I could, thus, be saying a) this little set of events was brought about by other, wider events.  Again, trivial; or, b) this little set of events was brought about by a specific chain of events, and would not have been brought about otherwise.  This latter sense of 'efficient cause' seems way too strong for what I believe.

I concluded 1 and 2 would be only trivially true at best, and that asking him metaphysical questions takes too much effort on my part.

O.

Oh, Religions, Why Do Ye Tempt Us?

Why is it that religion is attractive as a kind of practical philosophy of life for so many people? I was reading an article on this subject by paleontologist, Gregory Paul. He argued that if people are sufficiently secure from worry and subsistence lack, then religion would greatly decline. He states,

"If the entire planet enjoyed the same level of secure prosperity seen in France and Sweden, there is little doubt that the number of devout believers would sink to the teens or single digits, no matter what organized religions did to save themselves—even if nontheists did little to promote secularization."[1]

If this is right, I wonder, then, why some very financially well-off, and otherwise psychologically stable people still find religion a valued and practical activity to participate in. Perhaps formal religion as we know it, using traditional institutions as we seem them now, will go away, but I find it hard to believe people will forgo making transcendental postulates about reality.

For example, even mathematicians, a bunch known to be committed to efficiency and minimalism, argue vehemently about whether or not Platonism is a necessary metaphysical stance when dealing with the profound usefulness of mathematics for describing the concrete world.

I can only imagine that if just this one area of abstraction is up in the air for debate, then how much the more things like morality, consciousness, and beauty will create metaphysical opportunities for transcendental posits.  No, I don't think an economic or material happiness explanation is sufficient to explain the presence and decline or continuation of religion.  These issues may amplify how quickly people will reach for religious answers, buy they don't explain why religion is attractive (rather than not) when such matters are not worrying people. 

O.

REFERENCES

[image] Jaydee "Tempting" Flickr March 28, 2009 (Accessed Feb 18, 2010)

[1] Gregory Paul "On What Makes Relgion Popular -- Or Not" Science and Religion Today (Accessed Feb 18, 2010)

The Multiverse is speculative and wasteful

Sometimes I can't help but ponder this whole multiple universe issue. Maybe it's because I'm a philosopher that I'm attracted to this juicy piece of Science bait -- if talk of multiple universes really is Science, which has been at some controversy. There are two things that I often wonder about. The first is the role that multiverses are suppose to play in cosmological theories, which seems problematic to me. The second is the too-explosive range of universes that supposedly spring into subsistence when available quantum states are utilized as ways of mapping the possibilities from the immediate moment forward.

I
At first glance, it seems that were there a multiverse, it would not be observable, since any such other components of the multiverse are being created outside of our big bang light sphere. Indeed, every other component universe of the multiverse would have the same problem, that of not being able to observe anything outside it's own big bang light sphere.

"Look," someone might counter, "direct observation is not needed to establish or give evidence for the multiverse, for there are other, indirect ways to justify it. This theory has survived falsification and there are no other contenders for anything better." The idea here is that if some physics theory predicts an observational consequence of a multiverse, and we don't see that consequence, then the multiverse theory (or that particular type of multiverse theory) would be defeated.

Put differently, with a bit more detail, suppose somebody claims, that some observation set (+O1) entails a theory of an unobservable multiverse (-T2) And this theory of an unobservable multiverse, entails some other set of observational evidence (+O3). We then note that +O1 should always entail an observational correlation to +O3. So the scientific matter would stand as follows:

+O1 --> -T2
-T2 --> +O3
So,
+O1 --> +O3

If one noted the presence of +O1, but the absence of +O3, then that would be good Popperian[1] defeating evidence for -T2. But the harder problem is where we are now: Where we have +O1 and +O3 kinds of phenomena (from quantum theory, apparently) but the status of darling theory -T2 (the multiverse claim) is worrisome.

Suppose there is some other kind of unobservable theory, maybe of another kind of multiverse with vibrating strings, or maybe of super-powerful beings, or even of a supernatural being which holds the order of space and time together in the way we observe it. Indeed, perhaps there are several of these types of theories floating around. Call any one of them -Tn . (By analogy, suppose you had a jar of colored marbles, M. You close your eyes and pull out one of a certain color, which your near-by friend notes to himself as '+M_red'. But for your part, you can only say, '-M_n' to represent a marble whose color you don't know about.)

So the scientific matter would stand as follows:

+O1 --> -Tn
-Tn --> +O3
So,
+O1 --> +O3

If such a theory did not, up to the most recent testing, show any exception of correlation of +O1 to +O3, does that make it a good theory? There are an infinite number of -Tn -type of theories one could posit that are consistent with the noted observations. That's very worrisome. It looks like one is using speculative, metaphysical linkage to build a cosmological, scientific theory. But if intelligent design posits in biology have taught us anything, this all seems the wrong way to go, for whether the linkage is of a personal metaphysical object (God) or an impersonal metaphysical object (a non-observable super-structure), one leaves the realm of science as it's been practiced since Galileo.

Admittedly, I do think advocates of a multiverse theory can get around the above complaint; since posited, apparently unobservable entities sometimes turn out to be observable after all, as the history of the concept of 'gene' has shown. So my real problem is that cosmological positions about about a multiverse are derived from previously held commitments in quantum theory, and quantum theory is probably the most intensely tested, most reliable scientific theory known to science. Thus, what really tempts me to multiverse belief comes from the bottom-up issues of quantum theory, not from the top-down issues of cosmology. So let me now turn to this side of the issue.

II
The first step that seems to draw me in is what has drawn many in: the unrivaled empirical success of quantum mechanics. Many scientists intimately involved in quantum mechanics think it's more than just a handy mathematical model for organizing data; instead, they have the gaul to say it's "true", even if they often admit they don't understand what it all means. As Michio Kaku writes, “It is often stated that of all the theories proposed in this century, the silliest is quantum theory. In fact, some say that the only thing that quantum theory has going for it is that it is unquestionably correct.”

The second step that makes me muse all metaphysical about multiverse claims is the on-going engineering attempts at quantum computing. Whole governments and academic institutions are pumping big dollars into a form of computation that can use peculiar quantum mechanical phenomena like superposition and entanglement as a way of manipulating data, first by representing the data in parallel ways, and then by operating on all of those representations. But to harken back to the first step above, there are quantum mechanical phenomena, because the world itself has a real structure -- namely, a quantum structure. Quantum computing harness a lot of stuff going on in parallel, specifically bit storage and bit operations. But these parallel activities are supposedly not going on "here" -- so just where are they going on?

The third step which pulls at me is where I make a simple deduction from the first two temptations. We talk about our 'Universe', which is supposed to be the One, the Everything. And these quantum phenomena used in quantum computation are happening at some particular place, in somebody's lab. But these computations, beyond the observed phenomenon, are taking account of several different states which are "not" representative of some local lab's state of affairs. So they represent states of affairs that are not local, but removed from the local. What is the ontological status, the nature of the reality of this non-local place?

And now the mind-thrust begins. Apparently, the states represented by these quantum representations are states of 'possibilia', affairs that are possible in terms of what's happening now, but gain something extra -- call it 'subsistence' -- upon being stored as data. This is akin to the celebrated Schrödinger's cat issue, where the cat has no actual status until one looks at it, or until some arbitrary event collapses the cat's dual-subsistence into some non-arbitrary state of affairs plucked from the set of 'possibilia' --i.e., the cat, as both alive and dead, moves from subsistence into existence. So, just as there is an actual cat that enters a non-actual, dual-subsistence cat state for a bit; likewise, there are quantum phenomena that enter a non-actual state for a bit, and then -- well, it's just more than I really want to think about; but, I can't seem to avoid such thoughts. People are always writing about it, bringing it up in conversations, occasionally outright asking me about it -- even though I really wish they wouldn't.

Anyway, to summarize -- there's the way things are, and the way things might be, and the "might be's" are somehow accessible from the way things are in quantum computing. But a moment's thought makes one realize that there are an infinity of the way things 'might be' from the way things 'are.' At this moment I could utter, by voice, any given number. I might say "One!" at the top of my voice. Or I might whisper "Two-thousand eight -hundred and fifty-two to the 39th power." Short of having to just take the few moments to utter the very sounds it takes to identify the arbitrary number in question, there are an infinity of numbers I can select from. I could even partition my arbitrary utterances into a structure: I could resolve beforehand to utter only odd numbers, or only even numbers, or only numbers divisible by five --- it doesn't matter! I still get an infinity of choices within whatever pet basis criteria for utterance I happen to choose beforehand. This must mean that there are an infinity of parallel states of affairs that either could spring off, or do spring off from this very moment, from this tiny choice of what I may utter. Add all the other utterers available, and the possibilities loom ghastly large. What am I supposed to think of this? How am I supposed to think of this?

Maybe the latter question is at least tractable. Take a slightly different angle: why utter elements from infinite, structured sets of numbers? 'Too dang many chickens in that coop! Instead, in order to narrow things down, I could utter collections of formula from algebra: "1< y < 20", "x < y*3 < z." Hell, that's some pretty talk right there! I like this game! Again, how about this one: "Let z=x and x<7; and, x is either 2, 3 or 4; moreover, stipulate that x is not 4." Now I've thrown in some logic operations as well! Call this 'f' for fancy formula utterance. And for good measure let's call the set of answers for f (if there are any answers) by the capital letter 'Z'.

Behold -- my utterance f hangs in the air, held temporarily by my (and by any hearer's) short term memory, or maybe it would hang a bit longer if written on a chalkboard, or stored in a computer, or chiseled in granite -- whatever; it's stored someplace in some physical medium, where I, or somebody, can later retrieve it.

Certain strange ideas can arise here. Suppose you ask me how much I'm going to spend on coffee this morning. On the one hand, I could say, "Why, only as much as I have in my wallet!" But there is an exact amount in my wallet, I just happen to be ignorant of how much that amount is. On the other hand, and here's where the strangeness begins, I could say, "Why, f!" (And then I'd jump up and write the formula for f on the chalkboard so you're not clueless.) You'll grant me that there are different equivalent ways to write f on the chalkboard.

I could write the original locution:

f: "Let z=x and x<7; and, x is either 2, 3 or 4; moreover, stipulate that x is not 4."

Or, maybe this:

f1: "Let z=x+0 and x<7; and, x is either 2, 3 or 4; moreover, stipulate that x is not 4."

Or, though odd and extraneous, this:

f2: " Let z=x+1-1 and x+1-1<7; and, x+1-1 is either 2, 3 or 4; moreover, stipulate that x+1-1 is not 4."

The first, second, and third versions all have different information in them, a different collection of symbols, but they all yield the same list of answers in Z -- namely, { 2 , 3 }. (So, it's turned out that the variable z could be a legitimate answer for f in more than one way. So that's why we need not just 'z', but 'Z' to track the list of all legitimate answers.) When you ask me the coffee question, formula f is somehow identified as the answer, even if (chatty guy that I am) I answer your question in two or three different, but synonymous ways, likeunto f1 and f2 above.

Alas, now I'm forced to introduce yet another capital letter, 'F', to account for all the ways that I could synonymously utter (e.g., speak, or maybe chalk-down) f as an answer to your coffee question. A moment's thought shows there's an infinite number of elements in the set F. (I could also add zero, or two zeros, or three; or, I could add one, and then subtract it, or two, and then subtract it, or three...)

And now for further weirdness. As earlier, the states represented by Z are states of possibilia, affairs that are possible in terms of what's happening now (I might pay $2; I might pay $3 for coffee), but these 'possibilia' have gained subsistence upon being stored as data, the job that f is doing in our conversation. Restated, there's the way things are, and the way things might be, Z, and the "might be's" { 2, 3 } are somehow accessible from the way things are at the moment of conversation. So too are the states represented by F, and its "might be's", affairs that are possible in terms of what's happening now (I might restate f one way, another way, etc.), but these "might be's" { f, f1, f2, f3, ... fn } have likewise gained their own subsistence at the moment of conversation.

But now there's yet a further explosion on the already ghastly number of multiverse possibilia branching out from the moment of conversation. Granted, by uttering any synonymous phrase f within F, I've constrained my money commitment to only one of two expenditures, $2, or $3; but, that does not mean there is only two possibilia branching out in the multiverse. Why? Well, since there are an infinity of ways of communicating f (an infinite number of elements in F), there are a concomitant infinite number of subsisting possibilia too. An infinite number of me's, and an infinite number of you's out there waiting with baited breath for me to grab onto the horn of which dollar commitment I'll take as regards to coffee expenditures. Yet this infinity arises not because there are an infinite number of dollar options, but because there's an infinite number of ways of stating even a limited number of dollar options. Afterall, even if I'd just said "I'll spend two dollars," where Z has now only a single element { 2 }, F would still have it's infinite number of elements.

There's nothing in the laws of physical possibility, much less logical possibility, which constrain me to state f in one way rather than another. But this means there is this infinity of duplicate universes, this grand waste of me's and you's where there would be only a single, syntactic shuffle, a trade-off of a couple of extraneous +1's/-1's for a couple of extraneous +2's/-2's within F that separates whole branches or collections of branches within the multiverse. What's the lesson of that?

I will tell you. The multiverse is wasteful. Occam's razor counsels us not to multiply entities beyond necessity; but Quantum's razor provides us with the ugliest possible corollary to that claim: beyond entities there's the necessity of multiplication.

O.

REFERENCES

[Image] Nature.com (Accessed 1/2/2009)

[1] A quick over-view of Karl Popper's falsification procedure can be found by Ralph E. Kenyon, Jr., "Popper's Philosophy of Science" (Accessed 1/2/2009)

[ * ] I thought my first post of 2009 should be something both philosophically and scientifically oriented, since that's what the blog is supposed to be about. Yes, I'll admit I wander from that ideal now and then. And I can't believe I'm still piling time into this (so-called) little side venture of going on four years. The problem is that Google tells me that people from all over the world drop in on this blog, and about a third of them are returning visitors, so it always feels worth it to write something that people are going to read (or listen to).

Thinking about Freewill

A friend of mine got me thinking about issues of freewill (again). Admittedly, I've been trying to come up with a bit more nuanced statement on my position concerning free will. I think I'm satisfied with this one for the moment:

S has freewill to perform some action A just when (1) S might perform A or S might not perform A; and (2) the collection of all knowable physical facts about S are not sufficient to predict S's performance ahead of time.

I acknowledge that (2) is a fairly strong claim b/c it does not presume one can have all physical facts (consistent with current claims about quantum physics); and, it assumes there are facts about us which are not physical.

Note well that I do not mean to make this entail the existence of "souls" in the Cartesian sense, but only that there might be facts about our information structures, facts about our temporal-properties, facts which are about other facts about us (i.e., meta facts, such as about counterfactual states of affairs -- e.g. it is false that Brint might eat a concrete block.)

Sometimes physical facts might be enough to predict S's performance ahead of time. For example, someone could be addicted to nicotine in a way such that after a Mexican meal, the urge to smoke cannot be vetoed by their will. They might engage in smoking behaviors withoutt consciously monitoring or even thinking about it, much like we keep our head level on our shoulders without consciously monitoring or even thinking about it.

However, that S's actions can sometimes be predicted, does not mean S is never free. For S to be free, there has to be at least some instances where S might perform A or S might not perform A. It's just that in the Mexican meal case to claim "S might not perform A" happens to be false. The deeper issue would be to determine when or when not S does have a freewill.

I should note that by "might" I don't mean just the logical sense, but the stonger physics sense, where something might or might not happen given the way natural world is ordered. One might worry whether there are "unnatural" worlds, so perhaps my phrase "natural" world doesn't make sense. However, here are at least unnatural logical worlds, since computer simulations can manipulate objects with adjustments in what are otherwise the equations which map the natural world -- the latter being the one we are all born into. (Whether there are unnatural physical worlds is very controversial. My inclination is to say there are not.)

I think many worries about lack of freewill are present in people who forget that physical facts are merely a subset of all facts.

.O.